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author | Francis Rowe <info@gluglug.org.uk> | 2015-05-20 05:25:31 (EDT) |
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committer | Francis Rowe <info@gluglug.org.uk> | 2015-05-20 05:25:31 (EDT) |
commit | a2616e852ba1d861209f66ce4afc8728117a1acd (patch) | |
tree | 6145cf511482c49c8256c86208f15e521831ea2e /docs/future/coreboot_native_3.12_bug.tar.gz | |
parent | c8ecf72a8b46f1367a8165d7066b7f39cd44d71f (diff) | |
download | libreboot-a2616e852ba1d861209f66ce4afc8728117a1acd.zip libreboot-a2616e852ba1d861209f66ce4afc8728117a1acd.tar.gz libreboot-a2616e852ba1d861209f66ce4afc8728117a1acd.tar.bz2 |
docs/gnulinux/encrypted_*.html: Remove notes about --unrestricted
These instructions were dangerous. I was provided with them by a
user who found them, and I thought that it would be safe to allow
access to boot the HDD so long as the OS was encrypted. However,
this is not the point. With that option unrestricted, anyone with
physical access could replace the HDD with another LUKS-encrypted
one with the same set up (just a different system, different key,
different passphrase, etc) and now they are able to run their own
code on that laptop. This *is* dangerous. There is a lot that an
attacker can do to the laptop if they are able to boot an OS on it!
Basically, Francis Rowe was being foolish to add these instructions.
Now he's wised up a bit.
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/future/coreboot_native_3.12_bug.tar.gz')
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