From 8b2219bfa2da36e7809588ef723a10483a6e137f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Francis Rowe <info@gluglug.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2014 20:52:36 -0500
Subject: Documentation: *major* cleanup.
Cleanup was long overdue. Old structure was messy and inefficient.
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(limited to 'docs/howtos/t60_security.html')
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-<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html>
-<head>
- <meta charset="utf-8">
- <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
-
- <style type="text/css">
- body {
- background:#fff;
- color:#000;
- font-family:sans-serif;
- font-size:1em;
- }
- </style>
-
- <title>Libreboot documentation: Security on the ThinkPad T60</title>
-</head>
-
-<body>
-
- <header>
- <h1>Security on the ThinkPad T60</h1>
- <aside>Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad T60. This tutorial is <b>incomplete</b> at the time of writing.</aside>
- </header>
-
- <p>Or go <a href="../index.html">back to main index</a></p>
-
- <h2>Table of Contents</h2>
- <ul>
- <li><a href="#hardware_requirements">Hardware Requirements</a></li>
- <li><a href="#software_requirements">Software Requirements</a></li>
- <li><a href="#procedure">The procedure</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1 id="hardware_requirements">Hardware requirements</h1>
- <ul>
- <li>A T60</li>
- <li>screwdriver</li>
- <li>(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)</li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1 id="software_requirements">Software requirements</h1>
- <ul>
- <li>none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)</li>
- <li>You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS</li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1>
- Rationale
- </h1>
- <p>
- Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell.
- Hardware security is useful in particular to journalists (or activists in a given movement) who need absolute privacy in their work.
- It is also generally useful to all those that believe security and privacy are inalienable rights.
- Security starts with the hardware; crypto and network security come later.
- </p>
- <p>
- Paradoxically, going this far to increase your security also makes you a bigger target.
- At the same time, it protects you in the case that someone does attack your machine.
- This paradox only exists while few people take adequate steps to protect yourself: it is your <b>duty</b>
- to protect yourself, not only for your benefit but to make strong security <i>normal</i> so
- that those who do need protection (and claim it) are a smaller target against the masses.
- </p>
- <p>
- Even if there are levels of security beyond your ability (technically, financially and so on)
- doing at least <i>something</i> (what you are able to do) is extremely important.
- If you use the internet and your computer without protection, attacking you is cheap (some say it is
- only a few US cents). If everyone (majority of people) use strong security by default,
- it makes attacks more costly and time consuming; in effect, making them disappear.
- </p>
- <p>
- This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct memory access that
- could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be used to remotely
- command the machine (or leak data).
- </p>
-
- <h1 id="procedure">Disassembly</h1>
-
- <p>
- Remove those screws and remove the HDD:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0001.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0002.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Lift off the palm rest:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0003.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Lift up the keyboard, pull it back a bit, flip it over like that and then disconnect it from the board:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0004.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0005.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0006.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Gently wedge both sides loose:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0007.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0008.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove that cable from the position:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0009.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0010.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Now remove that bezel. Remove wifi, nvram battery and speaker connector (also remove 56k modem, on the left of wifi):<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0011.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
- Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.<br/>
- <b>Wifi:</b> The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have
- access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel
- card(most T60's come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs
- a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So
- it's risk-level is very high.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove those screws:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0012.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Disconnect the power jack:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0013.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove nvram battery (we will put it back later):<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0014.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Disconnect cable (for 56k modem) and disconnect the other cable:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0015.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0016.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Disconnect speaker cable:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0017.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Disconnect the other end of the 56k modem cable:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0018.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Make sure you removed it:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0019.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Unscrew those:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0020.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Make sure you removed those:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0021.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Disconnect LCD cable from board:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0022.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove those screws then remove the LCD assembly:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0023.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0024.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0025.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Once again, make sure you removed those:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0026.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove the shielding containing the motherboard, then flip it over. Remove these screws, placing them on a steady
- surface in the same layout as they were in before you removed them. Also, you should mark each screw hole after removing the
- screw (a permanent marker pen will do), this is so that you have a point of reference when re-assembling the machine:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0027.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0028.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0029.JPG" alt="" />
- <img src="t60_dev/0031.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0032.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0033.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove microphone (soldering iron not needed. Just wedge it out gently):<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0039.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
- <b>Rationale:</b><br/>
- Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets<a href="#ref1">[1]</a> compromised, it can
- record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if
- they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically
- be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). <b>In other words,
- the machine could already be compromised from the factory.</b>
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove infrared:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0040.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0042.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove cardbus (it's in a socket, no need to disable. Just remove the port itself):<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0041.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
- <b>Rationale:</b><br/>
- It has direct memory access and can be used to extract sensitive details (such as LUKS keys). See
- 'GoodBIOS' video linked at the end (speaker is Peter Stuge, a coreboot hacker). The video covers X60
- but the same topics apply to T60.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Before re-installing the upper chassis, remove the speaker:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0043.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0044.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
- Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.<br/>
- If your computer gets<a href="#ref1">[1]</a> compromised, it can be used to
- transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be
- turned into a microphone<a href="#ref2">[2]</a>.<br/>
- Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB).
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove the wwan:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0045.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
- <b>Wwan (3d modem):</b> They run proprietary software and have access to the
- computer's RAM! So it's like AMT but over the GSM network which is
- probably even worse.<br/>
- Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended).
- </p>
-
- <p>
- This is where the simcard connector is soldered. See notes above about wwan. Remove simcard by removing battery
- and then it's accessible (so, remember to do this when you re-assemble. or you could do it now?)<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0046.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Put those screws back:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0047.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Put it back into lower chassis:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0048.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Attach LCD and insert screws (also, attach the lcd cable to the board):<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0049.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Insert those screws:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0050.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- On the CPU (and there is another chip south-east to it, sorry forgot to take pic)
- clean off the old thermal paste (rubbing a1ocheal (misspelling intentional. halal internet)) and apply new (Artic Silver 5 is good, others are good too)
- you should also clean the heatsink the same way<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0051.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Attach the heatsink and install the screws (also, make sure to install the AC jack as highlighted):<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0052.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Reinstall that upper bezel:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0053.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Do that:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0054.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0055.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Attach keyboard and install nvram battery:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0056.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0057.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Place keyboard and (sorry, forgot to take pics) reinstall the palmrest and insert screws on the underside:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0058.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove those covers and unscrew:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0059.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0060.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0061.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Gently pry off the front bezel (sorry, forgot to take pics).
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Remove bluetooth module:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0062.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0063.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Re-attach the front bezel and re-insert the screws (sorry, forgot to take pics).
- </p>
-
- <p>
- It lives!<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0071.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0072.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0073.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Always stress test ('stress -c 2' and xsensors. below 90C is ok) when replacing cpu paste/heatsink:<br/>
- <img src="t60_dev/0074.JPG" alt="" />
- </p>
-
- <h2>
- Not covered yet:
- </h2>
- <ul>
- <li>Disable flashing the ethernet firmware</li>
- <li>Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)</li>
- <li>Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)</li>
- <li>Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)</li>
- </ul>
- <p>
- Go to <a href="http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html">http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html</a>
- or directly to the video: <a href="http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm">http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm</a>.
- </p>
- <p>
- A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above.
- </p>
-
- <h2>
- Also not covered yet:
- </h2>
- <ul>
- <li>
- Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws<br/>
- Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take
- some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity.
- Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop.
- </li>
- <li>
- Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack.
- <ul>
- <li>soldered RAM?</li>
- <li>wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)</li>
- <li>ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)</li>
- </ul>
- </li>
- <li>
- General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions.
- </li>
- <li>
- For example: <a href="http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/">http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/</a>
- </li>
- <li>
- https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3:
- </li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1>
- Extra notes
- </h1>
- <p>
- EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free
- non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM.
- It has access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some
- other power management features. The issue is that it has access to the
- keyboard, however if the software security howto <b>(not yet written)</b> is followed correctly,
- it won't be able to leak data to a local attacker. It has no network
- access but it may still be able to leak data remotely, but that
- requires someone to be nearby to recover the data with the help of an
- SDR and some directional antennas<a href="#ref3">[3]</a>.
- </p>
- <p>
- <a href="http://www.coreboot.org/Intel_82573_Ethernet_controller">Intel 82573 Ethernet controller</a>
- on the X60 seems safe, according to Denis.
- </p>
-
- <h2>
- Risk level
- </h2>
- <ul>
- <li>Modem (3g/wwan): highest</li>
- <li>Intel wifi: Near highest</li>
- <li>Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.</li>
- <li>Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.</li>
- <li>Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.</li>
- <li>EC: can be mitigated if following the guide on software security.</li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1>
- Further reading material (software security)
- </h1>
- <ul>
- <li><a href="encrypted_trisquel.html">Installing Trisquel GNU/Linux with full disk encryption (including /boot)</a></li>
- <li><a href="encrypted_parabola.html">Installing Parabola GNU/Linux with full disk encryption (including /boot)</a></li>
- <li><a href="dock.html">Notes about DMA access and the docking station</a></li>
- </ul>
-
- <h1>
- References
- </h1>
- <h2 id="ref1">[1] physical access</h2>
- <p>
- Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in,
- and explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do.
- Also the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take
- the probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of
- target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000$
- to 400000$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that
- but it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it
- makes it more risky and more costly to attack people.
- </p>
- <h2 id="ref2">[2] microphone</h2>
- <p>
- It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try
- yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have
- the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the
- microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called
- retasking. There is some support for it in GNU/Linux but it's not very
- well known.
- </p>
- <h2 id="ref3">[3] Video (CCC)</h2>
- <p>
- 30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While
- their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the
- transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time.
- <a href="http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm">http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm</a>
- </p>
-
-<hr/>
-
- <p>
- Copyright © 2014 Francis Rowe <info@gluglug.org.uk><br/>
- This document is released under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International Public License and all future versions.
- A copy of the license can be found at <a href="../license.txt">../license.txt</a>.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- This document is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See <a href="../license.txt">../license.txt</a> for more information.
- </p>
-
-</body>
-</html>
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