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+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+
+ <style type="text/css">
+ body {
+ background:#fff;
+ color:#000;
+ font-family:sans-serif;
+ font-size:1em;
+ }
+ </style>
+
+ <title>Libreboot documentation: Security on the ThinkPad T60</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+ <header>
+ <h1>Security on the ThinkPad T60</h1>
+ <aside>Hardware modifications to enhance security on the ThinkPad T60. This tutorial is <b>incomplete</b> at the time of writing.</aside>
+ </header>
+
+ <p>Or go <a href="../index.html">back to main index</a></p>
+
+ <h2>Table of Contents</h2>
+ <ul>
+ <li><a href="#hardware_requirements">Hardware Requirements</a></li>
+ <li><a href="#software_requirements">Software Requirements</a></li>
+ <li><a href="#procedure">The procedure</a></li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h1 id="hardware_requirements">Hardware requirements</h1>
+ <ul>
+ <li>A T60</li>
+ <li>screwdriver</li>
+ <li>(in a later version of this tutorial: soldering iron and scalpel)</li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h1 id="software_requirements">Software requirements</h1>
+ <ul>
+ <li>none (at least in the scope of the article as-is)</li>
+ <li>You probably want to encrypt your GNU/Linux install using LUKS</li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h1>
+ Rationale
+ </h1>
+ <p>
+ Most people think of security on the software side: the hardware is important aswell.
+ Hardware security is useful in particular to journalists (or activists in a given movement) who need absolute privacy in their work.
+ It is also generally useful to all those that believe security and privacy are inalienable rights.
+ Security starts with the hardware; crypto and network security come later.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Paradoxically, going this far to increase your security also makes you a bigger target.
+ At the same time, it protects you in the case that someone does attack your machine.
+ This paradox only exists while few people take adequate steps to protect yourself: it is your <b>duty</b>
+ to protect yourself, not only for your benefit but to make strong security <i>normal</i> so
+ that those who do need protection (and claim it) are a smaller target against the masses.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Even if there are levels of security beyond your ability (technically, financially and so on)
+ doing at least <i>something</i> (what you are able to do) is extremely important.
+ If you use the internet and your computer without protection, attacking you is cheap (some say it is
+ only a few US cents). If everyone (majority of people) use strong security by default,
+ it makes attacks more costly and time consuming; in effect, making them disappear.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ This tutorial deals with reducing the number of devices that have direct memory access that
+ could communicate with inputs/outputs that could be used to remotely
+ command the machine (or leak data).
+ </p>
+
+ <h1 id="procedure">Disassembly</h1>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove those screws and remove the HDD:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0001.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0002.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Lift off the palm rest:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0003.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Lift up the keyboard, pull it back a bit, flip it over like that and then disconnect it from the board:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0004.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0005.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0006.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Gently wedge both sides loose:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0007.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0008.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove that cable from the position:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0009.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0010.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Now remove that bezel. Remove wifi, nvram battery and speaker connector (also remove 56k modem, on the left of wifi):<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0011.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
+ Reason: has direct (and very fast) memory access, and could (theoretically) leak data over a side-channel.<br/>
+ <b>Wifi:</b> The ath5k/ath9k cards might not have firmware at all. They might safe but could have
+ access to the computer's RAM trough DMA. If people have an intel
+ card(most T60's come with Intel wifi by default, until you change it),then that card runs
+ a non-free firwamre and has access to the computer's RAM trough DMA! So
+ it's risk-level is very high.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove those screws:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0012.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Disconnect the power jack:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0013.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove nvram battery (we will put it back later):<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0014.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Disconnect cable (for 56k modem) and disconnect the other cable:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0015.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0016.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Disconnect speaker cable:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0017.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Disconnect the other end of the 56k modem cable:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0018.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Make sure you removed it:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0019.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Unscrew those:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0020.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Make sure you removed those:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0021.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Disconnect LCD cable from board:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0022.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove those screws then remove the LCD assembly:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0023.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0024.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0025.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Once again, make sure you removed those:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0026.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove the shielding containing the motherboard, then flip it over. Remove these screws, placing them on a steady
+ surface in the same layout as they were in before you removed them. Also, you should mark each screw hole after removing the
+ screw (a permanent marker pen will do), this is so that you have a point of reference when re-assembling the machine:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0027.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0028.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0029.JPG" alt="" />
+ <img src="t60_dev/0031.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0032.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0033.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove microphone (soldering iron not needed. Just wedge it out gently):<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0039.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
+ <b>Rationale:</b><br/>
+ Another reason to remove the microphone: If your computer gets<a href="#ref1">[1]</a> compromised, it can
+ record what you say, and use it to receive data from nearby devices if
+ they're compromised too. Also, we do not know what the built-in microcode (in the CPU) is doing; it could theoretically
+ be programmed to accept remote commands from some speaker somewhere (remote security hole). <b>In other words,
+ the machine could already be compromised from the factory.</b>
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove infrared:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0040.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0042.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove cardbus (it's in a socket, no need to disable. Just remove the port itself):<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0041.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
+ <b>Rationale:</b><br/>
+ It has direct memory access and can be used to extract sensitive details (such as LUKS keys). See
+ 'GoodBIOS' video linked at the end (speaker is Peter Stuge, a coreboot hacker). The video covers X60
+ but the same topics apply to T60.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Before re-installing the upper chassis, remove the speaker:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0043.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0044.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
+ Reason: combined with the microphone issue, this could be used to leak data.<br/>
+ If your computer gets<a href="#ref1">[1]</a> compromised, it can be used to
+ transmit data to nearby compromised devices. It's unknown if it can be
+ turned into a microphone<a href="#ref2">[2]</a>.<br/>
+ Replacement: headphones/speakers (line-out) or external DAC (USB).
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove the wwan:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0045.JPG" alt="" /><br/>
+ <b>Wwan (3d modem):</b> They run proprietary software and have access to the
+ computer's RAM! So it's like AMT but over the GSM network which is
+ probably even worse.<br/>
+ Replacement: external USB wifi dongle. (or USB wwan/3g dongle; note, this has all the same privacy issues as mobile phones. wwan not recommended).
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ This is where the simcard connector is soldered. See notes above about wwan. Remove simcard by removing battery
+ and then it's accessible (so, remember to do this when you re-assemble. or you could do it now?)<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0046.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Put those screws back:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0047.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Put it back into lower chassis:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0048.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Attach LCD and insert screws (also, attach the lcd cable to the board):<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0049.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Insert those screws:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0050.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ On the CPU (and there is another chip south-east to it, sorry forgot to take pic)
+ clean off the old thermal paste (rubbing a1ocheal (misspelling intentional. halal internet)) and apply new (Artic Silver 5 is good, others are good too)
+ you should also clean the heatsink the same way<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0051.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Attach the heatsink and install the screws (also, make sure to install the AC jack as highlighted):<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0052.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Reinstall that upper bezel:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0053.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Do that:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0054.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0055.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Attach keyboard and install nvram battery:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0056.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0057.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Place keyboard and (sorry, forgot to take pics) reinstall the palmrest and insert screws on the underside:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0058.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove those covers and unscrew:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0059.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0060.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0061.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Gently pry off the front bezel (sorry, forgot to take pics).
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Remove bluetooth module:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0062.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0063.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Re-attach the front bezel and re-insert the screws (sorry, forgot to take pics).
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ It lives!<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0071.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0072.JPG" alt="" /> <img src="t60_dev/0073.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Always stress test ('stress -c 2' and xsensors. below 90C is ok) when replacing cpu paste/heatsink:<br/>
+ <img src="t60_dev/0074.JPG" alt="" />
+ </p>
+
+ <h2>
+ Not covered yet:
+ </h2>
+ <ul>
+ <li>Disable flashing the ethernet firmware</li>
+ <li>Disable SPI flash writes (can be re-enabled by unsoldering two parts)</li>
+ <li>Disable use of xrandr/edid on external monitor (cut 2 pins on VGA)</li>
+ <li>Disable docking station (might be possible to do it in software, in coreboot upstream as a Kconfig option)</li>
+ </ul>
+ <p>
+ Go to <a href="http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html">http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2013/30C3_-_5529_-_en_-_saal_2_-_201312271830_-_hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodbios_-_peter_stuge.html</a>
+ or directly to the video: <a href="http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm">http://mirror.netcologne.de/CCC/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5529-en-Hardening_hardware_and_choosing_a_goodBIOS_webm.webm</a>.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ A lot of this tutorial is based on that video. Look towards the second half of the video to see how to do the above.
+ </p>
+
+ <h2>
+ Also not covered yet:
+ </h2>
+ <ul>
+ <li>
+ Intrusion detection: randomized seal on screws<br/>
+ Just put nail polish with lot of glider on the important screws, take
+ some good pictures. Keep the pictueres and make sure of their integrity.
+ Compare the nail polish with the pictures before powering on the laptop.
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ Tips about preventing/mitigating risk of cold boot attack.
+ <ul>
+ <li>soldered RAM?</li>
+ <li>wipe all RAM at boot/power-off/power-on? (patch in coreboot upstream?)</li>
+ <li>ask gnutoo about fallback patches (counts number of boots)</li>
+ </ul>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ Software-based security hardening (GRUB trust/cryptomount, kernel LUKS/ecryptfs, etc).
+ <ul>
+ <li>modify grub to delay password attemps by a few seconds, and fail after a set time (and record all attemps in a counter, writing that to nvram)</li>
+ </ul>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ General tips/advice and web links showing how to detect physical intrusions.
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ For example: <a href="http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/">http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/</a>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ https://gitorious.org/gnutoo-for-coreboot/grub-assemble/source/a61f636797777a742f65f4c9c58032aa6a9b23c3:
+ </li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h1>
+ Extra notes
+ </h1>
+ <p>
+ EC: Cannot be removed but can be mitigated: it contains non-free
+ non-loadable code, but it has no access to the computer's RAM.
+ It has access to the on-switch of the wifi, bluetooth, modem and some
+ other power management features. The issue is that it has access to the
+ keyboard, however if the software security howto <b>(not yet written)</b> is followed correctly,
+ it won't be able to leak data to a local attacker. It has no network
+ access but it may still be able to leak data remotely, but that
+ requires someone to be nearby to recover the data with the help of an
+ SDR and some directional antennas<a href="#ref3">[3]</a>.
+ </p>
+
+ <h2>
+ Risk level
+ </h2>
+ <ul>
+ <li>Modem (3g/wwan): highest</li>
+ <li>Intel wifi: Near highest</li>
+ <li>Atheros PCI wifi: unknown, but lower than intel wifi.</li>
+ <li>Microphone: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.</li>
+ <li>Speakers: only problematic if the computer gets compromised.</li>
+ <li>EC: can be mitigated if following the <b>(not yet written)</b> guide on software security.</li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <h1>
+ References
+ </h1>
+ <h2 id="ref1">[1] physical access</h2>
+ <p>
+ Explain that black hats, TAO, and so on might use a 0day to get in,
+ and explain that in this case it mitigates what the attacker can do.
+ Also the TAO do some evaluation before launching an attack: they take
+ the probability of beeing caught into account, along with the kind of
+ target. A 0day costs a lot of money, I heard that it was from 100000$
+ to 400000$, some other websites had prices 10 times lower but that
+ but it was probably a typo. So if people increase their security it
+ makes it more risky and more costly to attack people.
+ </p>
+ <h2 id="ref2">[2] microphone</h2>
+ <p>
+ It's possible to turn headphones into a microphone, you could try
+ yourself, however they don't record loud at all. Also intel cards have
+ the capability to change a connector's function, for instance the
+ microphone jack can now become a headphone plug, that's called
+ retasking. There is some support for it in GNU/Linux but it's not very
+ well known.
+ </p>
+ <h2 id="ref3">[3] Video (CCC)</h2>
+ <p>
+ 30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm from the 30th CCC. While
+ their demo is experimental(their hardware also got damaged during the
+ transport), the spies probably already have that since a long time.
+ <a href="http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm">http://berlin.ftp.media.ccc.de/congress/2013/webm/30c3-5356-en-Firmware_Fat_Camp_webm.webm</a>
+ </p>
+
+<hr/>
+
+ <p>
+ Copyright &copy; 2014 Francis Rowe, All Rights Reserved.<br/>
+ See <a href="../license.html">../license.html</a> for license conditions.
+ </p>
+
+</body>
+</html>